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Abstract. This paper projects the effects of exogenous fertility changes in Turkey on
the age structure of population and the standards of living using a semi-reduced-form
model of economic growth and demographic change. Both the technological progress
and the fertility rate are endogenous. The calibrated version of the model delivers
three important results: First, technological progress will be the major source of eco-
nomic growth in Turkey in the upcoming decades. Second, even with a non-declining
saving rate, the population aging will result in a growth slowdown since technological
progress is not fast enough in Turkey. Third, even under an increasing rate of techno-
logical progress, a permanent upward shift in fertility levels would imply, relative to
the benchmark, a significantly lower level of output per capita, a remarkably higher
level of dependent population, and a persistently lower share of the working-age pop-
ulation for many decades. These results suggest that the priority of policy-makers in
Turkey should be technological progress. The pro-natalist rhetoric, even if it proves
to be strong enough to persuade the people of Turkey to have more children in the
near future, does not have any economic significance.
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1. Introduction
Population aging is an inevitable outcome of the demographic transition during
which both fertility and mortality rates decline. Since the labor force is a key input
into production and innovation technologies, an aging population implies an increas-
ing level of dependency to the working-age population. This is expected to result
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in serious damage to the well-being of individuals in any country if technological
progress is not fast enough and if the systems of health care, education, and social
security are not ready for the increasing burden of dependency.1
The population aging problem seems to be the most dramatic in some European
countries, and most of these countries implement pro-natalist population policies. In
2009, according to the United Nations (2011), 19 European countries—where the total
fertility rate for the 2005-2010 period is less than 1.5—view fertility to be “Too Low,”
and 17 of these 19 countries want to “Raise” fertility.2
Pro-Natalism is, in fact, an old ideology that favors the expansion of populations
or, in a nationalist context, the population of a particular nation. Its origins are found
within the teachings of the Abrahamic religions, and pro-natalism is also associated
with attempts to use eugenics for nationalist and imperialist ends.3
Growth and demography in Turkey, as in many other developing economies, have
patterns that are similar to those experienced earlier by today’s developed economies.
Real output per capita has a long-run growth trend, technological progress—either
through innovation or through adoption or through sectoral reallocation—is not a
negligible source of economic growth, and fertility and mortality rates are decreas-
ing. Turkey’s population is already on the earliest stages of its aging path. According
to the United Nations (2011), Turkey’s total fertility rate of 2.2 for 2005-2010 is the
highest across Europe, and the view and the policy on fertility in 2009 are, respectively,
“Satisfactory” and “Maintain.”
Nothing is surprising about a satisfactory fertility rate to be maintained since
population policy in Turkey switched from being pro-natalist to being anti-natalist
in the mid-1960s.4 However, pro-natalism now “strikes back” with Prime Minister
Erdog˘an’s rhetoric of at least three children declared by himself publicly in various
occasions since March 7, 2008.5 Erdog˘an urges married couples to have at least three
children to keep Turkey’s population young and to avoid the problem of population
aging.
This paper constructs a semi-reduced-form model of economic growth and demo-
graphic change for Turkey to analyze the effects of exogenous upward shifts in fertility
rates. The main purpose is simply to inquire whether the pro-natalist rhetoric of
1. Clark et al. (1978) and Weil (1993) provide detailed surveys of the economics of population aging.
See Goldstein (2009) for an introduction to population aging from a demographer’s point of view.
2. The rise of pro-natalism in Europe is also evident from the European Commission’s (2005, p. 10)
Green Paper that indicates “the return to demographic growth” as an essential priority.
3. See Glass (1936) and Moskoff (1980), respectively, for discussions on the oppressive pro-natalist
policies of Mussolini’s Italy and the socialist Romania from an economic perspective.
4. See Levine and Üner (1978) for a discussion of the anti-natalist population policy formation in
Turkey.
5. Hürriyet Ar¸siv, “Erdog˘an: Give birth to at least three children,” http://goo.gl/KaMYF, March
7, 2008.
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Prime Minister Erdog˘an would have any economic significance in the near future if,
in the extremely unlikely case, this rhetoric proves to be sufficiently strong to persuade
the people of Turkey to have more children.
Prime Minister Erdog˘an’s rhetoric of at least three children has not caused a flow
of quantitative studies on growth and demography in Turkey, most possibly, for two
reasons: First, economists generally believe that not mere rhetorics but various sorts
of scarcities and incentives govern the human behavior. There is no need, then, to
care about the effects of baby booms until a serious pro-natalist change in population
policy formation takes place in Turkey. Gürsel et al. (2010), studying the determinants
of having more than the desired number of children in Turkey, for example, consider
three children a dream. The second reason is that an increase in fertility rates—due to
the worries about the working-age population—does not really make sense from an
economist’s point of view basically because Turkish economy does currently have a
record of high unemployment with jobless growth, low labor participation rates, and
a large pool of unskilled labor. Oyvat (2012), for example, indicates that a policy in
Turkey that targets higher fertility but no increase in labor participation would actu-
ally be supporting the increase of the unskilled labor force. Sayan (2013)—considering
all the arguments put forward by the supporters of the pro-natalist rhetoric—notes the
importance of long-run economic growth and rightly argues that an upward deviation
in fertility rates would not be a solution to the social security problems in Turkey.6
This paper aims at providing some quantitative results on the effects of the pro-
natalist rhetoric.7 The model economy constructed features endogenous technolog-
ical progress and endogenous fertility. According to the unified growth theory and
the new economic history literatures, both are essential in understanding the very
long-run evolution of economic growth and demographic change.
For Turkey, Ismihan and Metin-Ozcan (2009) and Çiçek and Elgin (2011) con-
clude that the growth of total factor productivity (TFP) is an important source of
economic growth, and the time-series evidence reported by Utku-Ismihan (2012) in-
dicate that the growth of an aggregate knowledge variable is positively associated with
economic growth over the period 1963-2010. The results obtained by Saygılı et al.
(2005) show that the aggregate TFP in Turkey has a secular growth trend after the
6. See Alper et al. (2012) for a detailed analysis of the effects of population aging on the sustainability
of the social security system in Turkey. In another comprehensive study, Tansel and Hos¸gör (2010)
study the effects of demographic change in Turkey on several sectors of the economy.
7. The only study that has a similar purpose is that of Açıkgöz (2012) who estimates that a return
to higher fertility in Turkey would necessitate a remarkably higher growth rate of the stock of
physical capital.
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early 1980s.8 The data on the number of enterprises and the share of R & D work-
force in Turkey further indicate that the reported growth in the aggregate TFP might
be explained by the logic of the second-generation Schumpeterian models that stress
the vertical (or R &D) and the horizontal (or Entry) dimensions of endogenous tech-
nological progress.9 This is not to say that Turkish economy is innovating in the same
way as the United States or Germany, and much of the observed increases in the num-
ber of enterprises and the share of R&Dworkforce may be translating into economic
growth through technology adoption. Assuming that both innovation and adoption
occur through R & D and Entry, the model economy of this paper is a semi-reduced-
form version of a typical second-generation Schumpeterian model with some other
extensions.10
The model economy treats fertility in reduced-form as a function of output
per capita. This is in line with the economic approach of Becker (1960, 1965),
Becker and Lewis (1973) and their followers that builds upon the quality-quantity
trade-off; the time-cost of reproduction increases with income, and parents choose to
have fewer but healthier and more educated children.11 Regarding the historical fertil-
ity decline in Turkey, Farooq and Tuncer (1974) and Behar (1995), for example, stress
the roles of social and economic development. The results summarized by HÜNEE
(2009) show that economic prosperity, education levels, and the use of modern con-
traceptives are inversely related with fertility rates. Selim and Üçdog˘ruk (2005) study
the quality-quantity trade-off in Turkey and find supporting evidence.
This paper is most directly related with the literature on the effects of population
aging on economic growth. The early pessimistic view that focuses only on physical
capital accumulation and life-cycle savings builds upon the implication that the aging
of population would result in a decrease in the aggregate saving rate. The work by
Cutler et al. (1990) concludes, for the United States, that population aging would neg-
8. The growth accounting exercises by Altug˘ et al. (2008, p. 395)—who consider the roles of vari-
ous factors such as institutions and human capital accumulation—show that “output growth in
Turkey is primarily due to capital accumulation, not TFP growth.” I˙mrohorog˘lu et al. (2012)—
who construct a two-sector model for Turkey—argue that both non-agricultural and agricultural
TFP growth have remained lower than those of peer countries with similar macroeconomic poli-
cies and records.
9. The prominent second-generation Schumpeterian models include those of Young (1998), Peretto
(1998), Aghion and Howitt (1998, Ch. 12), and Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998). In the models
of this type, the total R & D workforce in the economy is thinly distributed among innovating
firms that expand through entry.
10. Yeldan (2012) constructs a dynamic general equilibriummodel to understand the economic growth
in Turkey within a framework that incorporates R & D investments.
11. This, of course, is not to mean that the decline in mortality measures is not important for the
fertility decline. The long-run evidence recently documented by Herzer et al. (2012) for a large set
of countries do neither reject the role of mortality nor reject the role of output per capita. Since the
mortality transition itself depends on technological progress and increasing level of investments in
health care in the long run, the reduced-form approach of this paper indirectly associates the role
of declining mortality with the fertility transition.
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atively affect economic growth only in the very long run. Futagami and Nakajima
(2001) develop a simple model to show that, with an increasing life-span, the effects of
aging on the aggregate saving rate and growth would be positive. Bloom et al. (2003)
provide evidence in favor of such a positive relationship between life expectancy and
the saving rate. The simple calibration exercises reported by Scarth (2009) indicate
only a very modest decline in living standards. Irmen (2009) focuses on the channel of
innovation induced by the relative abundance of physical capital and offers optimistic
conclusions regarding the economic growth. Lee and Mason (2010) and Prettner et al.
(2012) study the human capital channel of endogenous growth and argue that the ag-
ing of population does not necessarily lead into growth slowdowns. Elgin and Tumen
(2012), also paying attention to human capital, show that economic growth can coex-
ist with a declining population. The model developed by Bruce and Turnovsky (2012)
indicates that, if higher life expectancy increases the retirement age as well, both eco-
nomic growth and the saving rate responds positively to population aging. Overall,
the recent literature that takes technological progress into account seems to have over-
turned the early pessimistic view of a negative aging-saving relationship. If population
aging negatively affects economic growth in the upcoming decades in the developed
and the developing world, this effect will be minor basically due to the sustained tech-
nological progress (see Bloom et al., 2010).
The main results of this paper on growth and demography in Turkey, following
from a calibrated version of the model, are the following:
• Technological progress will be the major source of economic growth in Turkey
until the end of this century.
• Even with a non-declining saving rate, the population aging in Turkey will re-
sult in a growth slowdown since technological progress is not fast enough.
• Even under an increasing rate of technological progress throughout the century,
a permanent upward shift in births per capita to its 1995 level—occurring in
2015—would imply a significantly lower level of output per capita, a remarkably
higher level of dependent population, and a persistently low level of the share
of the working-age population for many decades.
These results suggest that the priority of policy-makers in Turkey should be tech-
nological progress. The pro-natalist rhetoric, even if it proves to be strong enough to
persuade the people of Turkey to have more children in the near future, does not have
any economic significance.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section presents a discussion on the
long-run aspects of growth and demography to build some background. Section 3,
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after explaining why a semi-reduced-form approach is followed, introduces the model
economy. Section 4 describes the data and the strategy used to achieve the benchmark
calibration. Section 5 on the quantitative experiments presents the main results. Sec-
tion 6 discusses these results with special emphases (i) on the issue of intergenerational
conflict, (ii) on the congestion effects of a very high level of population, and (iii) on
the pro-natalist policies. Section 7 concludes with some remarks and is followed by
acknowledgements and the list of references.
2. Growth and Demography in the Long Run
2.1. From Stagnation to Growth
Economic growth and demographic change have remarkable long-run regularities
across countries: For a very long period of time before modernity, living standards
around the globe were low and stagnant, technological progress was slow and spo-
radic, fertility and mortality levels were high, and small and isolated populations were
young. Today, in countries where the transition to modernity first started, living
standards are high and growing, technological progress is fast and sustained, fertility
and mortality levels are at historically lowest levels, and populations are significantly
older.
The literature on unified growth theory, after the influential model of
Galor and Weil (2000), explicitly deals with the questions of (i) why today’s devel-
oped economies did stagnate for several millennia before the Industrial Revolution
and (ii) how the transition from stagnation to growth really occurred.12 These ambi-
tious questions are located within a framework that unifies the distant past with the
present, and the long-run processes such as the demographic transition are explicitly
studied by the unified growth theorists.13
The main lessons of the unified growth theory stress the importance of the
Malthusian checks during the early stages of economic development and the role
of latent variables that evolve behind the scenes during the stagnation era until the
very evolution of them causes some changes in incentives. Due to these changes, the
economy gradually leaves the stagnation trajectory to move to the growth trajectory
12. See Galor (2005, 2010) for two surveys of this literature.
13. The neoclassical growth models take the technological progress exogenous while what explains
economic growth is the technological progress. The endogenous growth models use either the
Marshallian externalities in physical and human capital accumulation or the Schumpeterian cre-
ative destruction to explain why and how technology advances. However, these are the models
designed to explain growth, and only the poverty trap models with multiple steady-state equilibria
leave some room for the stagnation equilibrium in the long run. However, the poverty trap models
explain either the stagnation or the growth but not the both. The unified growth theory unifies the
mechanisms that lead to the stagnation of several millennia followed by an endogenously occurring
gradual transition to the regime of sustained growth.
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Figure 1: GDP per capita and its Constant Growth Path in Turkey: 1950-2050
Purchasing power parity converted GDP per capita series, measured in 2005U.S.
dollars, is from the PENNWorld Tables 7.1 ofHeston et al. (2012). The constant
growth path is implied by a five-year percentage growth rate of g = 0.13 via
yt = y0(1+ g )
t .
without an exogenous shock.14
The earliest theoretical models of the transition from stagnation to growth have
either focused on human capital accumulation as the engine of growth—e.g. Lucas
(2002)—or treated technological progress in reduced-form as a function of population
level—e.g. Galor and Weil (2000). In response, some theorists have offered models
that explicitly account for the roles of business formation and the purposeful invest-
ments in the advancement of technology while the emphasis on the demographic tran-
sition is preserved. Two recent contributions in this stream are of Desmet and Parente
(2012) and Peretto and Valente (2011). Both models focus on the role of the market
size for firms in triggering purposeful innovation, and the latter explicitly deals with
14. In the canonical model of Galor and Weil (2000), for example, the key latent variables are pro-
ductivity and population: The rate of technological progress positively depends on the level of
population, and a low level of population during the early stages of economic development im-
plies a very slow rate of technological progress. In time, however, population very slowly expands
and this leads to an increasing rate of technological progress. In these early stages, adults choose
to increase their fertility due to the relaxing preventive check. The resulting higher rate of popu-
lation growth then translates into faster technological progress that at some point leads the adults
to choose to invest more into the quality of their children due to the skill-bias in technology. The
resulting dynamics of this canonical model overlap, in many respects, with the entirety of a typical
transition to modernity.
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Figure 2: Enterprises and the R & D Personnel in Turkey
The data for the number of enterprises is from the Turkish Statistical Institute
(2012, Table 15.1). The series is reconstructed from the numbers of entering and
exiting enterprises for five-year intervals. The data for the R & D personnel is
from the Turkish Statistical Institute (2013).
horizontal and vertical dimensions of technological progress.15
The model economy of this paper tries to understand the economic growth expe-
rience of Turkish economy to the present and to the future within the unified growth
perspective that emphasizes the continuity of the process of economic growth once it
starts. Figure 1 pictures the evolution of real GDP per capita in Turkey and its future
path that would be attained under a constant rate of growth, and Figure 2 suggests that
a second-generation Schumpeterian model such as that of Peretto and Valente (2011)
can be used to shed light on the aggregate TFP dynamics in Turkey. This is not to
mean that one should be overly optimistic about the long-run prospects of techno-
logical progress in Turkey. Models are just models, and nothing in reality guarantees
that the engines of technological progress in Turkey will remain at work in the future.
Models, however, are extremely useful if one wants to discipline the facts and to design
counterfactual experiments rigorously. This paper, motivated by the data pictured in
Figures 1 and 2, uses the theoretical framework of a second-generation Schumpeterian
model in semi-reduced-form for such purposes.
15. The model constructed by Peretto and Valente (2011) is also important for providing a rationale
for a stabilizing level of population in the long run and in solving for the endogenously determined
carrying capacity of the economy with respect to population.
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Figure 3: A Picture of the Demographic Transition across the World
The data is from the the United Nations (2010). Both life expectancy at birth and
the total fertility rate represent the averages of the following five-year periods.
2.2. Population Aging in the World and in Turkey
One would make no mistake by calling the process of population aging universal.
Figure 3 shows the recorded life expectancy at birth and total fertility rate for certain
groups of economies, for the world, and for Turkey. The more developed countries in
1950 had substantially higher life expectancies and substantially lower fertility. There
is, however, nothing unique about these records other than the fact that these are the
countries that started modernizing earlier.16
The demographic transition of Turkey summarized in Figure 3 is remarkable.
Compared with the averages of the less developed, least developed, and the world,
the life expectancy and the total fertility rate for Turkey are the closest to those of
more developed countries at the end of the sample. Despite this fast transformation,
however, the aging of the population in Turkey is still at its very early steps. Accord-
ing to the United Nations (2010), the median age in Turkey was 19.7 in 1950 and 28.3
in 2010, and the medium variant projections indicate that it will reach its historical
maximum of 47.0 in 2085.
The discussion of the problem of population aging requires the inspection of the
16. To have a sense of the historical continuity here, note that the life expectancy at birth and the total
fertility rate in England andWales were respectively around 40 and 5.3 at the very beginning of the
19th century (Woods, 2000). On the diffusion of the demographic transition, the nonparametric
evidence by Strulik and Vollmer (2010) indicate that, while there exists a club of low fertility that
exhibits within-club convergence, the group of the countries with high fertility does not exhibit
such a tendency. This would loosely suggest, from a purely empirical point of view, that having
high levels of fertility is transitory because more countries with high fertility rates are expected to
converge to the low-fertility club in the future.
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Figure 4: Population in Turkey: 1950-2095
The data for the five-year age groups is from the United Nations (2010). 0-14,
15-64, and 65-and-over populations are calculated accordingly.
working-age and the dependent populations. Figure 4 pictures the actual and the pro-
jected medium variant population levels for the dependent 0-14 and 65-and-over age
groups and for the working-age 15-64 age group in Turkey. It is evident from this
figure that Turkey has still around 25 years to benefit from its demographic dividend;
the total working-age population is expected to decline after 2040. It is also evident
that more than half of the total population in 2095 will be expected to remain in
the working-age population. Figure 5, on the other hand, shows the actual and the
projected medium variant dependency ratios for Turkey. These indicate expected in-
creases in the total and the old dependency ratios after 2020s, and, even if the total
dependency ratio is expected to remain lower than its pre-1970s levels, the expected
increases show the upcoming threat of population aging in Turkey.
How sound such discussions of population aging are remains as a serious question
basically because the dependency ratios do not take into account how mere numbers
of people from different age groups have economic and social effects when these peo-
ple live, work, and retire in a dynamic economy where fertility declines, technology
progresses, and the structural transformation continues. In this regard, what this pa-
per attempts to build is an economic approach to the question of population aging in
Turkey even though the scope is limited with measures such as income and consump-
tion per capita and no new “economic dependency” measure is explicitly defined.
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Figure 5: The Dependency Ratios in Turkey: 1950-2095
The dataset for the five-year age groups is from the United Nations (2010). 0-
14, 15-64, and 65-and-over populations are calculated accordingly. The Child
Dependency Ratio is the ratio of 0-14 population to 15-64 population, the Old
Dependency Ratio is the ratio of 65-and-over population to 15-64 population,
and, finally, the Total Dependency Ratio is the ratio of the sum of 0-14 and 65-
and-over populations to 15-64 population.
3. The Model Economy
3.1. The Virtues and the Limitations of the Reduced-Form Approach
Studies that aim to analyze the effects of population aging in general equilibrium en-
vironments with endogenous technological progress, endogenous fertility, and the
realistic demography of aging face the difficulty that we do not have this model (yet).
The problem is most recently reiterated by Bruce and Turnovsky (2012) who develop
a model with a realistic treatment of population aging but still without endogenous
technological progress.17
The potentials are much more limited when technological progress is to be ap-
proached in the line of models that incorporate endogenous thresholds for the acti-
vation of various types of innovative activities—e.g., Desmet and Parente (2012) and
Peretto and Valente (2011). A quantitative analysis of such models require data on
the very early phases of economic development during which the economy stagnates
with an almost zero rate of technological progress. Such a set of data for Turkey and
the Ottoman Empire is not available.
17. The realistic demography of aging is meant to imply a demographic structure that goes beyond the
standard structures of two or three overlapping generations.
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These considerations motivate a semi-reduced-form version of a second-generation
Schumpeterian growth model in the fashion of Peretto (1998) and Peretto and Valente
(2011). Basically, four decisions agents would take in general equilibrium are handled
in reduced-form, and four elements of the model—births per capita, the saving rate,
the share of R & D workforce, and the share of Entry workforce—are assumed to
be the functions of output per capita, i.e., the variable assumed to be carrying the
information of at what stage of its development the economy is.
The major limitation of this reduced-form approach is that, since the model is
set in semi-reduced-form with some components being similar to those of the corre-
sponding general equilibrium setup of Peretto and Valente (2011), there is in fact an
unknown mapping from the structural parameters of the model to the reduced-form
functions. This means that the model economy constructed cannot be legitimately
used to study the effects of parameter changes. The only exception is a preference pa-
rameter for fertility that does not show up explicitly in the general equilibrium solu-
tions of the shares of R&D and Entry workforce in Peretto and Valente (2011). Here,
it is assumed that, when this fertility parameter changes, it affects the shares of R & D
and Entry workforce through its effect on output per capita.18 See Laincz and Peretto
(2006) for an explanation of the logic of such models of R & D and Entry.
3.2. A Brief Overview
The time in the model, denoted by t and starting at t = 0, is discrete and increases
to infinity. The length of a period is 5 years for it implies a direct mapping from
model into the population data of the United Nations (2010). The economy is closed
to international trade and capital flows, and there does not exist government activity.
The model also assumes away human capital accumulation and unemployment, and
all working-age individuals are assumed to have a unit time endowment either spent
to child rearing or supplied to the labor market inelastically.
The economy, in period t , produces a massNt of differentiated goods using physi-
cal capital and labor as tangible factors of production. This mass of goods is subject to
change in time due to horizontal innovation (or Entry) and exit. There also exists an
intangible factor Xi t of production that represents the state-of-the-art level of knowl-
edge associated with the production of good i ∈ [0,Nt]. Xi t is subject to increase, for
each i , as a result of vertical innovation (or R&D).
Population is disaggregated into three age groups: the 0-14 group of children, the
15-64 group of working-age adults, and the 65-and-over group of the old. The stock
of physical capital changes in time depending on the levels of gross investment and
depreciation. Specifically, an endogenous fraction of total production—the saving rate
18. Note, in advance, that this parameter does change only in one set of experiments.
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or the investment share—is allocated as investment expenditure.
3.3. The Model
3.3.1. Population
Let j ∈ {c,w,o} index the three age groups such that c, w, and o respectively corre-
spond to 0-14, 15-64, and 65-and-over populations. Denote by P jt the population of
the age group j at the beginning of period t ; the total population is thus equal to
Pt ≡ P
c
t
+ Pw
t
+ P o
t
. The dynamics of {P jt } j∈{c,w,o} satisfy
P c
t+1
− P c
t
= Bt −D
i
t
−Rcw
t
−Dc
t
+M c
t
(1)
Pw
t+1
− Pw
t
= Rcw
t
−Rwo
t
−Dw
t
+Mw
t
(2)
P o
t+1
− P o
t
= Rwo
t
−Do
t
+M o
t
(3)
where Bt denotes the total number of live births, D
i
t
denotes the total number of
infant deaths, and {D jt } j∈{c,w,o} and {M
j
t } j∈{c,w,o} respectively denote the total number
of deaths and the level of net migration for the age group j . Here, Rcw
t
and Rwo
t
represent the numbers of individuals whose age groups change from t to t + 1: The
former denotes the number of those moving from childhood to working-age, and the
latter denotes the number of those moving from working- to old-age.19
To be explicit about Rcw
t
and Rwo
t
is necessary because not all individuals in 0-14
and 15-64 age groups move to the higher age groups in period t . Specifically, Rcw
t
and
Rwo
t
in the population dataset of five-year age groups respectively correspond to the
15-19 and 65-69 populations in period t + 1.
Let bt ≡ Bt/Pt denote births per capita. This measure of fertility is the key vari-
able of interest in this paper and assumed to be endogenously changing with output
per capita yt . Specifically, we have
bt ≡ b (yt−1) (4)
where b (yt−1) : R++ → R++ is continuous, strictly decreasing and bounded from
below such that
b ⋆ ≡ lim
yt−1→∞
b (yt−1)> 0 (5)
The fertility behavior characterized by (4) and (5) deserves some comments: The
19. Notice that the side-by-side summation of equations (1) to (3) yields the dynamics of total popula-
tion as in ∑
j
P
j
t+1−
∑
j
P j
t
= Bt −D
i
t
−
∑
j
D j
t
+
∑
j
M j
t
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continuity of b (•) is for simplicity only, and the dependence to lagged yt is for com-
putational ease. That bt is strictly decreasing with yt−1 is perhaps the easiest way
to “model” the fertility decline in a growing economy where there exists a quality-
quantity trade-off in fertility choice.20
Mortality andmigration patterns are exogenous, and one needs to be careful about
which per capita measures of mortality and migration are invariant to the changes in
fertility. Define
r cw
t
≡
Rcw
t
P c
t
, rwo
t
≡
Rwo
t
Pw
t
, pc
t
≡
P c
t
Pt
, pcw
t
≡
P c
t
Pw
t
, pwo
t
≡
Pw
t
P o
t
,d i
t
≡
D i
t
Bt
and
d j
t
≡
D jt
P j
t
,m j
t
≡
M jt
P j
t
∀ j ∈ {c,w,o}
Equations (1), (2) and (3) can now respectively be written as
P c
t+1
− P c
t
=



1− d i
t

bt
pc
t
− r cw
t
− d c
t
+mc
t

P ct (6)
Pw
t+1
− Pw
t
=

r cw
t
pcw
t
− rwo
t
− dw
t
+mw
t

Pw
t
(7)
P o
t+1
− P o
t
=

rwo
t
pwo
t
− d o
t
+mo
t

P o
t
(8)
and, under the assumption that {r cw
t
, rwo
t
,d i
t
,d c
t
,mc
t
,dw
t
,mw
t
,d o
t
,mo
t
} remains same
when bt changes exogenously, (6)-(8) allow one to keep track of changes in each pop-
ulation age group given mortality and migration per capita. In other words, when
there is a shift in bt , the same fraction of all infants die, the same fractions of 10-14 and
of 60-64 population move to the higher age groups, and the same fraction of individu-
als die and migrate, and the model isolates the effects of the changes in fertility from
other demographic determinants.21
3.3.2. Production
Let there exist an aggregate consumption index Yt of the differentiated goods as in
Yt ≡
∫ Nt
0
Y
η−1
η
i t
di
 η
η−1
(9)
20. As argued by Jones et al. (2011), there is no behavioral theory that robustly explains the negative
income-fertility correlation.
21. Section 4 explains how the data is used to obtain these invariant ratios.
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where η > 1 is the elasticity of substitution, Nt is the mass of differentiated goods,
and Yi t is the flow of good i in period t .
Suppose that the differentiated good i ∈ [0,Nt] is produced with a Cobb-Douglas
technology of the form
Yi t =Xi tk
α
i t
ℓ1−α
Y i t
with α ∈ (0,1), where Yi t denotes the level of output, Xi t represents the measure of
productivity, ki t is the stock of physical capital employed, and ℓY i t is the flow of the
homogeneous labor input.
In a symmetric equilibrium of this model economy, the local monopoly i produc-
ing the differentiated good i employs ki t = kt and ℓY i t = ℓY t as capital and labor.
Defining the average productivity as in
Xt ≡
1
Nt
∫ Nt
0
Xi tdi
and assuming that all local monopolies attain the average productivity in the initial
period, the symmetric level of production in period t is equal to Xtk
α
t
ℓ1−α
Y t
. Thus, the
total production, by (9), is equal to
Yt =N
η
η−1
t Xtk
α
t
ℓ1−α
Y t
(10)
Define now the aggregate levels of kt and ℓY t respectively as Kt ≡Ntkt and LY t ≡
NtℓY t . (10) then implies the familiar aggregate production function
Yt =N
σ
t
XtK
α
t
L1−α
Y t
(11)
where σ ≡ (η−1)−1 > 0 represents the positive externality associated with the increas-
ing variety of goods.
3.3.3. Capital Accumulation
Suppose that the stock of physical capital changes in time according to the standard
law of motion of the form
Kt+1−Kt = stYt −δKt (12)
where st ∈ (0,1) is the fraction of total production allocated as investment and δ ∈
(0,1) is the depreciation rate.
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The investment share st is endogenous and changing with yt−1 via
st ≡ s(yt−1) (13)
where s(yt−1) : R++ → (0,1) is continuous, strictly increasing and bounded from
above such that
s ⋆ ≡ lim
yt−1→∞
s(yt−1) ∈ (0,1) (14)
The motivation behind (13) and (14) is empirical: As recently reiterated by Strulik
(2012), the saving rates are not only higher in richer countries and for richer house-
holds in a country but also have a clear increasing trend within a country in the long
run. In Turkey, according to the PENN World Tables of Heston et al. (2012), the
investment share in GDP was less than 10% in 1950s and is around 20% in the first
decade of the 21st century.22
3.3.4. Technological Progress
Consider the aggregate representation of the production in (11). The relevant measure
of TFP given this aggregate is
Zt ≡N
σ
t
Xt
Technological progress has thus two dimensions: the average productivity Xt along
the vertical dimension of purposeful R & D investments and the number Nt of prod-
uct varieties along the horizontal dimension of entry. What follows next is a discus-
sion of how Xt and Nt change in time.
R & D. Suppose that each local monopoly i ∈ [0,Nt] purposefully invests in R &D
and realizes an incremental increase in its productivity Xi t via the research technology
of the form
Xi t+1−Xi t = γℓX i tXt (15)
with γ > 0, where ℓX i t > 0 is the flow of labor input allocated to R & D by firm i .
Under symmetry across i , we have ℓX i t = ℓX t , and (15) implies
Xt+1−Xt = γℓX tXt (16)
The task here is to specify how ℓX t is determined in reduced-form. Define firstly
the total R & D workforce in the economy as LX t ≡NtℓX t . Since every working-age
22. Strulik (2012) uses this historical regularity as a motivating point for an extension of the neoclassi-
cal growth model with the time-preference rates endogenously changing with wealth.
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individual has a unit time endowment supplied inelastically, the labor share of R & D
satisfies
ℓˆX t ≡
LX t
Pw
t
and it is assumed that ℓˆX t changes endogenously with yt−1 as in the cases of bt and st .
Specifically, we have
ℓˆX t ≡ ℓˆX (yt−1) (17)
where ℓˆX (yt−1) : R++ → (0,1) is continuous, strictly increasing and bounded from
above such that
ℓˆ⋆
X
≡ lim
yt−1→∞
ℓˆX (yt−1) ∈ (0,1) (18)
Entry and Exit. The law of motion for Nt is specified as in
Nt+1−Nt =φLN t − etNt (19)
where φ > 0 is a parameter that represents the unit productivity of labor in research
towards entry, LN t is the flow of labor allocated into this research activity, and et ∈
(0,1) is the common exit rate that is exogenous. What motivates a time-varying exit
rate is the data that shows a sharp increase in the percentage of exiting firms in Turkey
after 1990s.
The share ℓN t of Entry workforce, as in the case of ℓˆX t , is an important determi-
nant of technological progress and defined as in
ℓN t ≡
LN t
Pw
t
In reduced-form, it is assumed that ℓN t changes endogenously with yt−1 as in the
cases of bt , st , and ℓˆX t :
ℓN t ≡ ℓN (yt−1) (20)
Here, ℓN (yt−1) : R++→ (0,1) is a continuous and strictly increasing function that is
bounded from above such that
ℓ⋆
N
≡ lim
yt−1→∞
ℓN (yt−1) ∈ (0,1) (21)
3.3.5. The Cost of Reproduction and the Labor Market
We can now close the model by imposing the resource constraint with respect to
labor.
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On the demand side, we have the total Entry workforce LN t , the total R & D
workforce LX t , and the total production workforce LY t .
On the supply side, it is assumed that bt births per capita where 15-64 population
is equal to Pw
t
cost ψbtP
w
t
units of labor. Here, ψ > 0 is a fixed parameter that rep-
resents the “unit” time cost of reproduction, and this is the simplest way to model
the time cost where the relevant fertility measure is bt .
23 With ψbtP
w
t
units of labor
being allocated to child rearing, the total supply of labor is equal to Pw
t
(1−ψbt ). The
resource constraint thus solves the only undetermined variable of the model, LY t , as
in
LY t = P
w
t
(1−ψbt )− LX t − LN t (22)
4. Data and the Benchmark Calibration24
This and the following section summarize the results of the benchmark calibration
and the counterfactual experiments. For the entire analysis, the horizon of the model
starts from the year 1950 and extends to the period 2095-2100 at which the 2010 Re-
vision of World Population Prospects by the United Nations (2010) ends.
4.1. Data Sources
There are four main sources for the data used in this paper. These are the World
Population Prospects of the United Nations (2010), the Statistical Indicators by
the Turkish Statistical Institute (2012), the PENN World Tables 7.1 of Heston et al.
(2012), and the data by the Turkish Statistical Institute (2013) on the R &D personnel
by occupation and sector of employment.
The United Nations (2010) provide data and projections (i) on population for five-
year age groups from 0-4 to 100-and-over, (ii) on births, deaths, and net migration,
and (iii) on other demographic indicators such as the total fertility rate and the median
age, all for the period 1950-2100. The quantitative work of this paper utilize (i) and (ii)
with medium variant projections. On the annual numbers of newly established and
liquidated enterprises, the data used is from the Turkish Statistical Institute (2012).
This covers the period of 1965-2011, and the original source of the data is the Union of
23. In models that feature a time cost of reproduction, the fertility variable is in general taken to be
the number of children per adult, and the time cost is specified at the individual level.
24. The careful reader may be urged to raise, at this point, the question of what the steady-state of this
economy does look like. This paper does not study the steady-state basically because the scope is
limited with the effects of fertility changes in the near future. The models of this class in general
attain well-behaved and unique steady-states that exhibit saddle-path stability. With endogenous
population growth, the important question is by which mechanism the level of population stabi-
lizes in finite time. Note that, since mortality and migration are exogenous and fertility is treated
in reduced-form, a steady-state could easily be constructed. This, however, would not change the
main results of the paper.
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Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey. Finally, the PENN World Tables 7.1
of Heston et al. (2012) provide, for the years 1950-2010, the Purchasing Power Parity
converted GDP per capita in 2005 dollars and the share of investment expenditures in
the GDP.
4.2. Mortality, Migration, and the Working-Age Population
Recall that (i) per capita measures of mortality and migration and (ii) the fractions of
individuals moving from 10-14 to 15-19 and from 60-64 to 65-69 age groups are to be
calculated since these measures are not readily available from the data.
First, r cw
t
and rwo
t
are calculated from the data as in
r cw
t
=
No. of individuals aged 15-19 in t + 1
No. of individuals aged 10-14 in t
rwo
t
=
No. of individuals aged 65-69 in t + 1
No. of individuals aged 60-64 in t
where the need to look at one period ahead arises because the numbers of deaths
and migrants for each five-year age group are not observed—e.g., the total number of
individuals moving from 10-14 to 15-19 age group in period t should be among the
surviving and the non-migrating of the 10-14 age group.
Next, since the population sums of the age groups c, w, and o and bt and d
i
t
are
known, equations (6) to (8) can respectively be used to solve for
−d c
t
+mc
t
− dw
t
+mw
t
− d o
t
+mo
t
Since both death and migration works in the same way in determining the working-
age population, knowing the per capita measure

−d jt +m
j
t

for the age group j ∈
{c,w,o} is all what the quantitative analyses of this paper need.
4.3. The Calibration Strategy
4.3.1. The First Step: Calibrating γ , φ, ψ and K0
In this first step, three structural parameters of the model, i.e., γ ,φ andψ, and the ini-
tial value of the stock of physical capital, i.e., K0, are calibrated to match the evolution
of output per capita yt from 1955 to 2010. The algorithm used, by solving the model
for each iterate of (γ ,φ,ψ,K0), minimizes a quadratic form of scaled deviations—
between model-generated observations that depend on (γ ,φ,ψ,K0) and the observed
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data—defined as in
Q(pi)≡
12∑
t=1

 ydatat − yt (pi)
0.5(ydata
t
+ yt (pi))

2
where pi ≡ (γ ,φ,ψ,K0).
The capital elasticity α of output in (11) is set to 0.3 as in Çiçek and Elgin (2011),
and the elasticity η of substitution in (9) is set to 2.5 as in Connolly and Peretto (2003).
The five-year depreciation rate δ is calculated via
δ = 1− (1−δannual)
5
where δannual estimated for Turkey by Çiçek and Elgin (2011) is 0.047. The implied
value of δ is equal to 0.2139. The initial values of P jt for j ∈ {c,w,o} and of Nt is set
from the data in millions, and X0 is normalized so that Z0 = 1.
For this calibration to work, the model must be fed by the data sequences of bt , st ,
ℓˆX t and ℓN t that are specified in the second step as functions of yt−1 and all the other
exogenous sequences of the demographic variables.
For bt , the data for Bt and Pt from the United Nations (2010), and, for st , the
investment share data in the PENNWorld Tables 7.1 of Heston et al. (2012) are used.
The latter is reconstructed as the five-year averages to obtain some smoothness.
For ℓˆX t , a limiting value of ℓˆ
⋆
X
= 0.0077 is set. This is the corresponding aver-
age value of 2005-2010 for the United Kingdom according to the World Development
Indicators.25 Then, using the Turkish Statistical Institute (2013) data for the period
1990-2010, a logistic fit for 1950-2095 is calculated using the imfil package written by
Kelley (2011).26
A similar approach is followed to construct ℓN t where the dynamics of firm entry
and exit in the data from the Turkish Statistical Institute (2012) are informative. First,
since the exit rate et shows a sharp increase in 1990s and is bounded above, a logistic
function of t with a steady-state exit rate of 5.5% is fitted.27 Then, φℓN t in the data is
constructed using the data on Nt , the fitted series et , and the working-age population
Pw
t
. After this, an arbitrary benchmark value of 0.007 is imposed for φℓN t , and a
logistic fit as a function of t is obtained.28
With all the inputs being fed into the model in the ways discussed above, the
25. The reason of why, say, the corresponding value for the United States is not used is the lack of
headcount data in R & D.
26. imfil package executes an exhaustive search over the parameter space to achieve global minima,
and the search is responsive to hidden constraints originating from the construction of the model.
In this paper, imfil package is used even though the model does not have any hidden constraints.
27. This is close to the exit rate in the United States in tranquil times of business cycles; see
Tutino and Cheremukhin (2012, Fig. 2).
28. Note that, since the calibration algorithm chooses φ, the arbitrariness of 0.007 does not affect the
quantitative results significantly.
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Table 1: The Benchmark Calibration (The First Step Results)
Parameter / Initial Value Symbol Value Comment / Source
Capital Share α 0.300 Çiçek and Elgin (2011)
Elasticity of Substitution η 2.500 Connolly and Peretto (2003)
Depreciation Rate δ 0.214 Calculated from the annual depr.
R & D Technology γ 0.313 Calibrated (1st Step)
Entry Technology φ 0.039 Calibrated (1st Step)
Cost of Reproduction ψ 0.718 Calibrated (1st Step)
Physical Capital K0 0.111 Calibrated (1st Step)
Enterprises N0 1.582 Data
Productivity X0 0.736 Implying Z0 = 1 given N0 and η
0-14 population P c0 8.377 Data
15-64 population Pw0 12.227 Data
65-and-over population Po0 0.634 Data
Table 2: The Fitted Functions for bt , st , ℓˆX t and ℓN t
Variable Function
Births Per Capita (bt ) b (yt−1) = 0.0504+
0.5679
1+exp[(5.2727)yt−1]
The Saving Rate (st ) s (yt−1) =
0.3524
1+exp[(−6.174)yt−1]
− 0.1403
The Share of R & DWorkforce (ℓˆX t ) ℓˆX (yt−1) = 0.001+
0.0077−0.001
1+exp[(−11.4872)(yt−1−0.5905)]
The Share of Entry Workforce (ℓN t ) ℓN (yt−1) = 0.0148+
0.0857−0.0148
1+exp[(−19.3905)(yt−1−0.38728)]
algorithm that chooses pi ≡ (γ ,φ,ψ,K0), in essence, uses the production function to
match its inputs with its output. γ governs the dynamics ofXt ,φ ofNt , andψ of LY t .
By choosing K0 and, then, adjusting the scaling factor of yt accordingly, the algorithm
also chooses the capital-output ratio in the initial period. Table 1 summarizes the
results.
4.3.2. The Second Step: Fitting the Reduced-Forms for bt , st , ℓˆX t and ℓN t
The first step of the calibration strategy returns the unknown model inputs given the
data on bt , st , ℓˆX t , ℓN t and on other population measures. Since only bt is endogenous
among the demographic variables, obtaining reduced-form functions for bt , st , ℓˆX t
and ℓN t is necessary and sufficient to complete the task of calibration. In this second
step, the functions in equations (4), (13), (17) and (20)—respectively for bt , st , ℓˆX t
21
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Figure 6: Model vs. Data: Fertility, Saving, and Technological Progress
and ℓN t—are parameterized and fitted using the data for bt , st , ℓˆX t and ℓN t described
above and the sequence of yt−1 obtained in the first step.
It turns out that, for all functions to be parameterized and fitted, a type of the
generalized logistic function is the most appropriate alternative.29 Table 2 presents
these fitted logistic forms.
For future reference, the parameter of interest here is the numerator of the fraction
in b (yt−1). This parameter, in a complete model of economic demography, would be
taken to represent the adults’ preference for higher fertility and is equal to 0.5679 in
the benchmark calibration.30
29. Since yt grows in time and since ℓˆX t and ℓN t are already described as logistic functions of t , this is
not surprising for these two variables.
30. What motivates this interpretation is the partial equilibrium solution to fertility in the model of
Peretto and Valente (2011, Eq. (19)). This solution reads, in the authors’ notation,
b (t ) =
µ
ψ
y(t )
− h(t )
where µ > 0 is the parameter of fertility preference, ψ > 0 is a parameter representing the unit
time cost of reproduction as in this paper, y(t ) is the consumption expenditure per capita and h(t )
is the shadow value of humanity that governs the optimal family size in the dynamic program of
the representative dynasty.
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Figure 7: Model vs. Data: Output per capita and Population
4.4. The Benchmark Path of Economic Growth
The goodness-of-fit of the benchmark calibration is pictured in Figures 6 and 7. Over-
all, the model performs well in explaining the dynamics of fertility, the populations of
different age groups, and output per capita. Since small deviations in births per capita
naturally translate into large differences in levels, the relatively poorer performance
of the model in matching bt results in a relatively poorer performance in matching
the 0-14 population. The effects on 15-64 and 65-and-over populations, on the other
hand, remain very minor.
Of particular interest here is the future of economic growth in Turkey. Three
different technological progress scenarios for the 21st century are considered:
• (ITP) The first technological progress scenario is the one the benchmark cali-
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Figure 8: Economic Growth under Different Technological Progress Scenarios
bration builds upon. In this scenario, both ℓN t and ℓˆX t are increasing functions
of yt−1. Due to the lack of a better choice, this technological progress scenario
is labeled with ITP for Increasing rates of Technological Progress.
• (FTP) In the second technological progress scenario, both ℓN t and ℓˆX t remain
at their 2010 levels so that the period after 2015 represents Turkey’s maximum
potential for technological progress. This scenario is labeled with FTP for Fixed
rates of Technological Progress.31
• (ZTP) The last scenario for ℓN t and ℓˆX t considers the extreme situation of no
technological progress beyond 2015. Specifically, ℓN t and ℓˆX t are assumed to be
equal to zero for 2015 and beyond. This third scenario is labeled with ZTP for
Zero rates of Technological Progress.
31. Strictly speaking, since the exit rate et still increases, the growth rate of Nt under this scenario is
not necessarily fixed.
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Figure 8 pictures the resulting dynamics of the level of output per capita and its
gross 5-year growth rates under these three scenarios.
It is evident from this figure that technological progress will be the major source
of economic growth in Turkey in the upcoming decades. Under the third scenario
with no technological progress, the gross 5-year growth rate sharply decreases into
the zone of economic decline. On the other hand, the decline in the growth rate
is common under all three scenarios. Technological progress in Turkey—even with
increasing levels of ℓN t and ℓˆX t—is not fast enough to compensate for the effects of
the decreases in the share of the working-age population.
Regarding the magnitudes of these growth slowdowns, the gross 5-year growth
rate remains higher than 1.0604 at its lowest (in the year 2090) under the ITP sce-
nario, and this corresponds to an annual growth rate of 1.18%. These gross 5-year and
percentage annual rates for the FTP scenario are, respectively, 1.0216 and 0.43% per
annum. Not surprisingly, if the technological transformation in Turkey stops where
it is already, the future of economic growth would be remarkably darker.
5. The Effects of Fertility Changes: Two Experiments
We are now ready to see the effects of exogenous upward shifts in the fertility level
and the fertility preference. Of interest are two counterfactual experiments:
1. The first experiment studies the effects of an exogenous upward jump of bt ,
occurring in 2015, to its 1995 level where the corresponding (average) TFR was
around 2.90. This jump is assumed to be permanent so that bt remains fixed at
its 1995 level until the end of the 21st century.
2. The second experiment, on the other hand, studies the effects of an exogenous
permanent increase in the preference for higher fertility, again occurring in 2015,
such that bt jumps to its 1995 level in 2015, but, then, is allowed to vary with
yt−1 as in the benchmark scenario. More specifically, the fertility preference
parameter of 0.5679, the one that is emphasized above, permanently shifts to
1.1287 by a factor of 1.9875.
Both experiments are implemented under the three technological progress sce-
narios introduced above, and the Figures 9 and 10 respectively show the effects of
Experiments 1 and 2 on
• births per capita,
• the dependent population,
• the share of the working-age population, and
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Figure 9: Effects of a Permanent Upward Shift in the Fertility Level
The direct shift in bt is to its 1995 level. ITP, FTP, and ZTP are respectively
for the scenarios of Increasing, Fixed, and Zero rates of Technological Progress.
Output per capita is drawn relative to its benchmark.
• output per capita.32
From Figure 9 that shows the results of Experiment 1, it is clearly observed that
the prime determinant of the dependent population and the share of the working-age
individuals is the permanently higher level of births per capita.
Since a constant flow of babies join the 0-14 age group in every period, the share
of the working-age population exhibits a very sharp decrease under all technologi-
cal progress scenarios. Besides, after 2035-2040—when the benchmark share of the
working-age population achieves a maximum—there remains a difference of around
10% between the benchmark and the experimented levels that persists until the end
of the century. This is important in showing that a permanent upward shift in births
32. Note that the effects on consumption per capita are very close to the effects on output per capita.
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Figure 10: Effects of a Permanent Upward Shift in the Fertility Preference
The shift in bt is to its 1995 level but occurs because the preference parameter for
higher fertility shifts permanently. ITP, FTP, and ZTP are respectively for the
scenarios of Increasing, Fixed, and Zero rates of Technological Progress. Output
per capita is drawn relative to its benchmark.
per capita cannot solve the problem of increasing (total) dependency ratio if migration
and mortality patterns remain as projected by the United Nations (2010).
Not surprisingly, the dependent population in Experiment 1 shows a fast and
steady increase and approaches to the tremendous level of 120 million at the end of
the century. This, again, is true for all technological progress scenarios and would
raise, in curious minds, the question of whether the carrying capacity of Turkey for
dependents is below or above this number.
The technological progress scenarios, on the other hand, do matter for the evolu-
tion of output per capita. The important result is that, even under the ITP scenario,
a permanent shift in bt results in a gradual but deep decrease relative to the bench-
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mark growth path. Specifically, output per capita under the ITP scenario reaches its
benchmark growth path as late as 2075-2080 while the acceleration of growth starts
after 2050. Under the FTP scenario, on the other hand, output per capita persistently
remains lower than its benchmark growth path while the decline itself decelerates at
around 2060—leaving output per capita 45% lower than its benchmark. These figures
are, of course, considerably worse under the ZTP scenario where the economy invests
neither into R & D nor into Entry.
As Figure 10 shows, the situation changes remarkably under Experiment 2 which
studies the permanent upward shift in fertility preference. In this experiment, since
fertility keeps responding to output per capita, the increase in the dependent popu-
lation and the decrease in the share of the working-age population remain relatively
modest under the scenarios ITP and FTP. Even though the dependent population re-
mains lower than 50 million under these two scenarios, however, the persisting differ-
ences from the benchmark remain within 5 to 10 million dependents. It is true that
the share of the working-age population eventually catches up with its benchmark,
but this happens as late as 2060. Besides, once again, the evolution of the working-age
population under the ITP and FTP scenarios shows that a permanent deviation in the
preference for higher fertility is not the solution to the increasing dependency in the
long run.
The effects on output per capita also deserve some comments. Since fertility
quickly decreases after its shift, the ITP scenario results in a modest decrease and a
relatively quick recovery; the largest deviation is around −10% and the catching up
with the benchmark occurs at around 2055. The FTP scenario however results in a
discomforting deviation which would be around −45% at the end of the century.
Overall, then, neither of the two experiments indicates a benefit resulting from
higher fertility. In contrast, both experiments show that higher fertility would not
serve as a cure for the expected decline of the working-age population—if it does not
make the situation worse as in the case of 120 million dependents.
6. Discussion
The results presented in the last two sections, respectively, show that (i) technological
progress will be the major source of economic growth in Turkey throughout this
century and (ii) the return to demographic growth with higher fertility rates would
not only make the prospects of output per capita worse for many decades but also
result in higher dependency measures in the future.
This section provides a brief discussion of these results with special emphases on
three issues: First, since the ITP scenario indicates that output per capita would be
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higher in both experiments after its decline and its catch-up, the issue of intergen-
erational conflict deserves some space in this paper. Second, some remarks on the
congestion effects of increasing dependency are presented for those who may be im-
pressed by the return of growth towards the end of the century. Finally, the switch to
a pro-natalist population policy in Turkey is discussed in the light of the quantitative
results.
For all three issues, the inspirations originate mainly from Golosov et al. (2007)
who extend the concept of Pareto efficiency, for the first time, into environments
with endogenous population growth in a satisfactorily general way. Of their main
interest are efficiency concepts that do and do not consider the welfare of the unborn
generations. Their main results are (i) that the dynastic model of endogenous fertility
by Barro and Becker (1989) leads to efficient population in general and (ii) that non-
pecuniary externalities result in violations of the (revised) first fundamental theorem
of welfare economics.
6.1. The Intergenerational Conflict
The ITP scenario’s optimism results in a level of output per capita that is around 35%
higher than its benchmark in 2090 if the births per capita shifts permanently to a
constant; see Figure 9.33
To frame the discussion here, consider two representative individuals, A and B,
such that the individual A’s age is a > 0 at 2045—when output per capita relative to
its benchmark is the lowest—and that the individual B’s age is a > 0 at 2090—when
output per capita relative to its benchmark is the highest within the model horizon.
In spirit of Golosov et al. (2007), the individual A’s welfare loss in 2045 for the in-
dividual B’s welfare gain in 2090 cannot be supported as Pareto-dominating relative to
the benchmark without a carefully constructed micro-founded model of endogenous
fertility, and, furthermore, the question is to a large extent empirical since nothing
ensures a priori that the particular theoretical model constructed is a good enough
description of reality.
6.2. The Congestion Effects
Individuals A and B in the above discussion lose or gain welfare regardless of the pop-
ulation level. In reality, with a dependent population of around 120 million—which
corresponds to a total population of around 250 million—in 2090, the individual B
33. According to the spirit of the model economy, this is basically due to a very large number LN t
of the total Entry workforce—with the total working-age population in 2090 being close to 130
million—since the total R & D workforce is thinly distributed among the increasing number of
firms.
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would likely to be adversely affected by the congestion effects of a very high level of
population.
The congestion effects are most important in the consumption of pure public
goods with non-rivalry and non-excludability from the perspective of Pareto effi-
ciency. The main question is whether the systems of health care, education, and social
security, and other spheres where public goods such as the infrastructure are enjoyed
will be ready to carry the heavy burden of a dependent population of 120 million.
Would not such a level of dependency pose a threat to the well-being of the individual
B and those in other ages in 2090 if the positive externalities due to the economies
of scale had already been expended? Would the individual B really choose to have a
Maserati or a Ferrari that she could not use to commute due to some excessive traffic
jam? According to Golosov et al. (2007) who put forward these ideas using the exam-
ple of pollution, such global negative externalities of overpopulation simply lead to
Pareto inefficiency.34
An illuminating work on the congestion effects of a higher level of population
is provided by the National Research Council (1986, Ch. 9). The conclusion there
simply reads
When negative [population] externalities exist, a minimum policy prescription [for
a developing economy] would include the subsidized provision of family planning
services to allow couples to achieve their desired levels of fertility. (p. 84)
6.3. The Pro-Natalist Population Policies
The last task in this section is to briefly discuss the merits of pro-natalist population
policies.35 The pro-natalist population policy is an important issue in itself given
the pro-natalist rhetoric in Turkey and the implementation of pro-natalist policies by
many European countries.
Very recently, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Babacan declared in a televised
interview36 that
Mr. Prime Minister has instructed me to lead efforts with all other related ministries.
We need to implement some very smart measures. We need a well-outlined plan that
would take into account possible effects on budget balances.
We do not know which “very smart measures” can or will be adopted. Accord-
ing to the United Nations (2011), countries use a variety of measures such as “baby
34. Overpopulation also leads to lower real wages for the property-less workers in other setups, but
this is not necessarily Pareto-inefficient since it is a pecuniary externality—see Golosov et al. (2007).
35. Attar (2012)—in an invited and non-refereed paper—provides a non-technical discussion of the pro-
natalist population policy for a general audience.
36. Anadolu Agency, “Erdogan orders measures to ward off population decline,”
http://goo.gl/AAQyh, January 30, 2013.
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bonuses, family allowances based on the number of children, extended maternity and
paternity leave, subsidized child care, tax incentives, subsidized housing, flexible work
schedules, and campaigns to promote the sharing of parenting and household work
between spouses.” However, the effectiveness of these policy measures on fertility
rises is not clear. Goldstein et al. (2009) document that, even though policies seem
to have positively affected fertility in Estonia, Lithuania (to some extent), and Russia
(after 2007), (i) there were fertility rises with no major change in population policies
(as in Spain before 2007 and Russia between 2004 and 2007) and (ii) policies in some
countries had no effect on fertility rates (as in Singapore and Japan). RAND (2011,
p. 75), regarding the effects of pro-natalist policies, states that “Policy matters, but
probably only a little,” while the attention is paid to Sweden and Nordic countries
where
a comprehensive long-term government effort to stimulate female labour participa-
tion, and gender equality in the workplace and the family,
goes along with very high total fertility rates in European standards.
Returning to the welfare economics of Golosov et al. (2007) with endogenous pop-
ulation growth, we are left with the serious task of understanding why, in a given
country and at a given time period, the recorded fertility rates and the level of popu-
lation is too low (or too high). Golosov et al. (2007, p. 1066) state that the argument
based on the notion that the social benefit of high fertility exceeds its private ben-
efit does neither explicitly point to any negative externalities of low population nor
provides an explanation to why the (revised) first fundamental theorem of welfare eco-
nomics would not hold. In other words, it is not easy to argue a priori that an econ-
omy does have a Pareto-dominating population growth path that would be achieved
under some pro-natalist policy intervention. As Golosov et al. (2007, p. 1066) rightly
put forward, without knowing the precise source of an inefficiency, a serious policy
debate is impossible.
Bloom et al. (2010), after considering various channels through which population
aging affects economic growth, propose five policies, and the pro-natalist population
policy is not one of them. According to the authors, (i) governments should find ways
to direct the old but healthy people to work, (ii) the investments to improve the health
of the elderly should be reconsidered, (iii) policies should encourage labor force par-
ticipation more generally, (iv) immigration would make a big difference, and, finally,
(v) the reforms in the pay-as-you-go social security systems are to be implemented.
These ideas depict—to say the least—some serious doubts on the notion of an ac-
tive government intervention to boost fertility rates. We do not really know how
effective such interventions are in the first place, and we have no convincing theory
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on the welfare economics of population growth, as of today, that indicates that fer-
tility in Turkey is too low to imply an efficient path of population level to the long
run.
7. Concluding Remarks
The famous French sociologist August Comte is believed to have said “Demography
is destiny!” From an economist’s point of view that takes scarcity and choice seriously,
it is not! Humanity, coming from a dark distant past of subsistence, short lives, and
no invention, has been moving for the last 250 years or so to a state of growing ma-
terial standards of living, longer lives, and sustained invention. Some nations forge
ahead, some remain as the followers, and many others have not yet partially or fully
joined the journey of economic development. Yet, responding to the increasing cost
of reproduction and to decreasing mortality measures, most human populations have
reduced their fertility rates. Investing less into the objects and the bodies and more
into the intangible stocks such as knowledge and human capital has been the norm
for many of those living in this planet. At the individual level, in fact, there is nothing
really destined about marriage and fertility choices. Some choose to bring many ba-
bies to the world, and some choose to not. The age of marriage increases on average,
and some prefers to remain childless.
The pro-natalist rhetoric that remains ignorant on the history and the theory of
economic growth and demographic change does neither help resolve the problem of
population aging nor provide a new insight other than the ones implied by ancient
teachings such as “Be fruitful, and multiply!” The results provided in this paper show
that, even if Turkey, in the coming decades, can successfully direct more and more
working-age individuals into the jobs by which they create more useful knowledge,
the upward shifts in fertility rates would result in a lower level of per capita income
and consumption for many more decades until which per capita income and con-
sumption exceeds their no-fertility-shift paths. This naturally brings us back to the is-
sues of altruism and intergenerational conflict, but one needs to be very careful about
the long-run implications of the baby booms: First, the aging of the population is
inevitable, and nothing insures the Turkish economy against a delayed crisis of the re-
tiring baby boom generations. Second, again under the most optimistic technological
progress scenarios for Turkey, the congestion effects of a remarkably higher level of
population are going to be extremely adverse in terms of welfare. The projections of
per capita income and consumption do not take into account such consequences of
the baby booms in health, education, and other spheres where citizens exploit public
services.
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We do not know whether there is going to be a switch in Turkey from the igno-
rant pro-natalist rhetoric to a serious population policy that has a broad social vision
and long-run considerations. We also do not know what the governments in Turkey
are going to do with respect to research policy in order to keep Turkey on the path of
sustained technological progress. The view of unified growth theory—enriched with
the lessons of endogenous growth and new political economy literatures—suggests
that the best way of dealing with an aging population is to ensure that the systems
of health care, education, and social security are ready for the increasing burden of
dependents and that, with sound political and economic institutions, the engines of
economic growth are working properly. According to the results of this paper, tech-
nological progress will be themajor source of economic growth in Turkey throughout
this century if it does not stop for some reason.
Unless distorted by a sizable baby boom in a late stage of the demographic tran-
sition, the aging of population comes only once to an economy, and, if there exists
a stable path to a long-run growth equilibrium with an aging population, to design
and to implement the policies that would lead the economy to converge to this path
is possibly the wisest thing to do.
This paper does not build upon explicit individual and social welfare functions
and provides no policy analysis. Neither the problem of low labor force participa-
tion rates nor the issue of high unemployment is explicitly incorporated. Much work
on the issue of growth and demography in Turkey is thus left for future research. A
tractable and reliable dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous techno-
logical progress and endogenous fertility that we can utilize in the analyses of various
pro-natalist and social security policies, for example, is highly desired.
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